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A Philosophical Account of Coerced
Self-Incrimination
George C. Thomas III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although few would dispute that law and philosophy developed from
the same tradition or even that law uses philosophical concepts, a prem-
ise of much legal scholarship is that law has developed its own methodol-
ogy and is wholly separate from philosophy.' This attitude may reflect,
in part, a feeling that philosophy is more esoteric or difficult than law,
and that lawyers are ill-equipped to venture into philosophical thickets.
It is true, of course, that philosophers often think about issues far
removed from pragmatic reality while lawyers have to deal with real
cases and real people.2
But law and philosophy cannot be so easily divorced. Indeed, judicial
opinions can be seen as forming a data set that permits rough tests of
philosophical concepts. While an individual case may reach an aberrant
result, a relatively stable judicial concept will likely emerge over time.
Perhaps courts define philosophically-related concepts differently than
philosophers, but I think that unlikely. Philosophers do not invent philo-
sophical accounts, and judges do not invent interpretations of legal con-
cepts. Both groups draw from the surrounding culture.3
One way to gain insight into cultural attitudes toward a particular
question is to look for similarities in legal and philosophical treatments of
that question.4 I wish to examine one potential parallel between law and
* Many people commented helpfully on this material either in its present form or as part of a
larger project. I cannot thank everyone but must thank Harry Frankfurt, Alan Wertheimer, Larry
Crocker, Doug Husak, Richard Boldt, Jon Hyman, Eric Neisser, Vicki Been, and Kathy Brickey. In
addition I tried out the basic theory on my 1991 Criminal Procedure class at Rutgers and benefitted
from the comments of the students.
1. For a sophisticated account of law's unique methodology which does not fall into the trap of
claiming that law is conceptually separate from philosophy, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986).
2. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 13 (1988).
3. See George C. Thomas III, Legal Skepticism and the Gravitational Effect of Law, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (1991).
4. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 308 (noting that there may be "much less to the difference
between law and morality than might be supposed"). For a more specific historical similarity, see
George C. Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle,
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philosophy by comparing the prevailing judicial account of coerced self-
incrimination with the prevailing philosophical treatment of coercion. I
will focus on the question of when, in particular cases, the police (P)
coerce a suspect (S) into answering questions (A). The principal source
of legal protection against this kind of coercion is the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause. The clause provides that "No person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 5 As
the clause prohibits compulsion rather than coercion, I begin with the
assumption that compulsion and coercion are co-extensive concepts, an
assumption I will later question. Moreover, I am interested only in coer-
cion that causes (or will cause) an incriminating response. The extent to
which government can penalize a refusal to testify-when the coercion is
resisted-is a wholly separate question.
Theories of coercion take at least four forms: empirical, normative,
positive liberty, and social constructionist. The classical view, which
finds its origins in Aristotle, consists in an empirical conception of coer-
cion. An empirical conception presupposes that an outside witness can
determine, on the basis of observation and very basic assumptions about
human behavior, when S's action cannot be attributed to her own will.
In Aristotle's example, a person is coerced (or, perhaps better, com-
pelled) when "the principle of action is external" to S herself - as when
she is "carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had [her] in their
power."7 In a category of less extreme cases, the very nature of P's
threat will give us reason to be confident that we cannot attribute S's
action to her own free choice. For example, if P says to S, who owns a
valuable necklace, "Give me your necklace or I will shoot you," and S
then hands over her necklace, we would presumably be justified in saying
that the will of P displaced the will of S-that P coerced S to give him
her necklace.
Aristotle also acknowledged the central limitation of an empirical con-
ception: so long as S gives over her necklace herself (it is not torn from
her neck), the act is in some sense a reflection of her will.I She had a
choice: her necklace or her life. She could have refused and hoped that P
would not shoot her. On an empirical account, we may well be justified
in saying that S was coerced, but we must recognize that S could have
done otherwise, albeit against rational judgement.
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 251-52 (1991) (noting that Thomas Hobbes's self-incrimination
concept appeared in English cases of his time).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
6. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutorial comment on defendant's
refusal to testify held to be an impermissible penalty).
7. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 111.1, 1110a20-35.
8. Aristotle gives the example of a tyrant who orders one "to do something base, having one's
parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise
would be put to death." Aristotle says that "[s]uch actions, therefore, are voluntary; but in the
abstract perhaps are involuntary, for no one would choose any such act in itself." Id. at 11 10al-22.
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Because of this problem, some argue that the basis for identifying coer-
cion is the essentially normative question whether we should excuse S for
complying with P's demand. This question turns on whether P put such
pressure on S that she was left with a choice that she should not have had
to face. If S turns over her necklace after P says, "Give me your necklace
if you want to make me happy," we would probably be unsympathetic to
S's claim that she was coerced. Certainly, P put pressure on S to induce
her to give up her necklace, but the choice urged upon S by P is not
wholly outside the bounds of friendship. Notice that the focus of the test
has changed: we are not asking directly whether P displaced S's will;
instead we are asking the normative question whether P forced S to make
a choice she should not reasonably have had to make.9
A normative conception explains why the choice between turning over
a necklace and being shot is coercive even though in some sense S volun-
tarily chose to turn over her necklace. An even clearer distinction
between the empirical and normative viewpoints is seen in the case where
P tells S, his employee, that he will fire her unless she has sex with him.
Here, the argument that S voluntarily did P's bidding is perhaps more
plausible; she had other options that are not as unpleasant as the chance
of being shot (she could immediately resign, accept the risk that P would
carry out his threat, or sue him for harassment). Yet in a normative
sense P has coerced S, because he has forced her to make a choice that
we would find unfair.
Of course, a normative conception works less well when the situation
is itself morally ambiguous. Suppose P says to S, "Give me your neck-
lace or I shall tell the authorities that you embezzled money from your
employer." Assuming S is guilty of embezzlement, has she been left with
an unfair choice? Has P behaved immorally? The morally ambiguous
universe of police investigations presents a very similar set of problems
for the normative viewpoint, as I discuss in Part IV below and else-
where; 0 for while police are engaged in the morally worthy conduct of
trying to solve a crime, their use of coercion in order to get S to answer
questions is presumably immoral (if we take the self-incrimination clause
as a principle of morality). Yet if we cannot answer the coercion ques-
tion without answering the morality question, we may have no answer to
either.
A third view, in the Kantian tradition, is a positive liberty conception,
by which standard S is coerced if she doesn't have the rational capacity,
or is too misinformed, to do other than accede to P's will. 1 For exam-
9. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 214-17.
10. See Thomas & Bilder, supra note 4, at 265-69.
11. See ROBERT NozicK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 353 (1981) (describing Kant's
tradition as: "we are free when our acts are done in accordance with reason, when a law of reason
determines them"). Positive liberty can encompass much more than the knowledge and capacity
necessary to achieve rational self-control. It can also include the right to have government meet
1993]
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ple, assume that P knows that a rescue squad is only moments away
when he tells S he will save her from drowning only if she gives him her
necklace. If S knew that a rescue squad was on its way, she would not
give up her necklace, so P's threat would be ineffectual but for S's igno-
rance; given her ignorance, his threat is, in fact, effective. As a result, S's
surrender of the necklace in this situation may be thought of as coerced
just because uninformed. Or assume S is compulsively unable to say no
to any request. Her surrender of the necklace may be coerced because
unfree. On a positive liberty account, one cannot act freely in the
absence of rational self-control and adequate information.
The fourth account, social constructionist, is similar to the positive lib-
erty account. On a social constructionist view, we cannot say whether
S's action was coerced before we investigate the way S's preferences were
structured before her interaction with P. If, as some argue, we have no
preferences that exist independently of social interaction, then the key
question is who structures the interaction and what it looks like in all its
complexity.12 For example, if S has been brainwashed by P-types to
accede graciously to any request for her jewelry, then we may want to
say that even if S's action of giving up her necklace was voluntary in
some restricted sense, she nonetheless did not do so freely. The social
constructionist account has particular force when dealing with agents
who, like police, occupy an authoritative social position-not unlike that
of parents, teachers, doctors, and lawyers-which "convey[s] some echo
of dominance intertwined in some degree with alluring promises of nur-
turance [and which] stacks the deck toward 'willing' (though often
'resentful') submission by suspects, children, students, patients, or cli-
ents."" 3 On this account, whether P displaced S's will in the particular
interaction between the two is quite irrelevant, and whether S's choices
were unfairly constrained is quite complex.
My task in this paper is to sketch a philosophical account of coercion
developed by Robert Nozick, and to locate that account among the con-
ceptual frameworks I have just laid out. Then I want to show how a
version of Nozick's theory might operate as a judicial conception of
coerced self-incrimination, and how it might explain the jurisprudence.
By doing this, I hope to offer some tentative evidence of how our culture
views coercion.
certain basic needs so that we can be free of those concerns. See, e.g., LAWRENCE CROCKER,
PosrrIVE LIBERTY 2 (1980) (describing this position as "positive libertarian"). I use "positive
liberty" in this paper, however, only in the Kantian sense.
12. See Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of
Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 173 (1990) (arguing that S may have no
preferences of her own that "exist prior to and independent of social interaction"; what we think of
as "her" preferences are, instead, socially constructed, molded by "forces that make various choices
more or less attractive").
13. Robert A. Burt, Loving Big Brother: Comments on Seidman, Police Interrogation, and the
Fifth Amendment, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 187 (1990).
[Vol. 5: 79
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II. A BEGINNING POINT
I begin with a coercion account formulated by philosopher Robert
Nozick from the writings of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6.14 I start
here for two reasons. First, Nozick's account has always seemed to me,
on an intuitive level, to capture the essence of coercion. Second, it has
been seminal, and is now widely accepted, at least in its basic outline,
within the philosophical community.I5 The acceptance by the philosoph-
ical community of Nozick's account is reason enough to begin with it.
Nozick's basic account has five conditions:
(1) P threatens to do something to S if S does NA (where, e.g., NA
is not answering questions in a way that satisfies P), and P knows he
is making this threat;
(2) NA with the threatened consequence is rendered substantially
less eligible as a course of conduct for S than NA without the
threatened consequence.
(3) P makes this threat in order to get S to do A (where A is to
answer in a way that satisfies P), intending that S realize that she has
been threatened by P;
(4) S does A;
(5) Part of S's reason for doing A is to avoid (or lessen the likeli-
hood of) the thing which P has threatened. 6
Before I go on in Part III to discuss the theory in detail, I want to
make a few preliminary points about the basic structure of the account.
Condition 1 requires a threat (which I will explain below). Condition 2
requires that the threat be effective, that it make doing NA substantially
less eligible for S as a possible course of conduct. This ensures that
threats that S considers trivial are not considered coercive-for example,
P's threat that he will be sad if S does not surrender her necklace.'
Nozick's account might be called a narrow, or strict account of coer-
cion in that it requires that P intend to threaten S and thus requires a
subjective inquiry into P's thoughts as well as the inevitable subjective
14. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (P. Laslett, W.
Runciman & Q. Skinner eds., 1972). As the formulation of the account is Nozick's, I will refer to it
as Nozick's account, despite his acknowledged debt to H.L.A. Hart and Tony HonorS.
15. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 206; Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"--Virtue
Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 559 n.70. See also Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1353 n.220
(1984) (calling Nozick's account the "locus classicus" for the definition of coercion used by several
recent theorists).
16. See Nozick, supra note 14, at 102-04. Nozick modified some of the conditions offered early
in his paper. I use the modified conditions. He also added additional conditions to allow the
account to withstand certain counterexamples. See id at 103-07. As self-incrimination issues are
not likely to resemble these counterexamples, I use the five conditions of the basic account, which I
have adapted slightly to fit a self-incrimination context.
17. There is an obvious overlap between conditions 2 and 5. If the threat is trivial enough, then
presumably it is not part of the reason S does A. Depending on how expansively condition 5 is
interpreted, however, some threats may satisfy condition 5 but not condition 2.
19931
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analysis of why S acts. Indeed, the only completely objective aspect of
the account is condition 4 (S does A). The strict nature of Nozick's
account also excludes the cases where S reasonably but mistakenly
believes she has been coerced (if, say, P was merely brandishing his gun
as a joke), as well as those where the "coercion" comes from non-human
physical forces or S's own internal psyche.II
We can see that a strict coercion account highlights a potential linguis-
tic distinction between "coerce" and "compel." "Coerce" implies a pur-
poseful state of mind on P's part, but the same may not be true of
"compel." We might say S was compelled by the sun or by his master to
wear a hat; we say S was coerced by his master to wear a hat; but we do
not say that S was coerced by the sun to wear a hat. 19 In contrast, com-
pulsion might exist if P issues what S perceives as a threat even though P
did not intend what he said to be a threat. In the interrogation context,
this situation might exist if the police engage in certain activity that has
the effect of threatening S even though they did not mean it as a threat at
all. Under Nozick's account of coercion, however, inadvertent compul-
sion cannot be coercion.
Whether we want to identify instances of "strict" coercion or "mere"
compulsion turns, I think, on what it is we want our account to do.
There are at least two reasons we would want to identify unfree acts on
S's part, and while they are often linked, they need not be. First, freedom
and unfreedom are highly relevant to our ascription of responsibility,
legal or moral. If we are strict voluntarists about responsibility, then our
determination that S was coerced into doing A will excuse her from
moral responsibility or legal liability.2"
A related concern is whether someone else can be blamed for S's invol-
untary conduct. If S does some bad action A, but only because she was
coerced by P, then we may want to exculpate S (at least partially) and
blame P. Blame most clearly belongs to P if P intended to make S act
unfreely.2" Thus, the question is whether we want a theory of unfree acts
to excuse S or to apportion responsibility between S and another human
actor. If the latter is what we want, then we want an account that both
18. See CROCKER, supra note 11, at 17 (arguing that, on a less strict use, both of these categories
may be considered coercion).
19. See Westen, supra note 15, at 560. But see CROCKER, supra note 11, at 17 (noting a
nonstandard but "perfectly well understood use of 'coercion' in which non-human conditions may
coerce").
20. Since Aristotle was largely concerned with the types of action deserving of praise and blame,
his account of coercion focuses on the question whether S freely did A, not whether P caused S to do
A. He makes this clear in his claim that involuntary acts are those "performed under compulsion or
through ignorance." Supra note 7, at 1109b10. See also HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Coercion and
Moral Responsibility, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 46 (1988) ("A man's will
may not be his own even when he is not moved by the will of another.").
21. See CROCKER, supra note 11, at 16-17.
[Vol. 5: 79
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identifies when S acts unfreely and fixes the responsibility for S's unfree
act.
Which of these accounts would we want for deciding cases under the
self-incrimination clause? While the self-incrimination clause is written
in the passive voice and uses "compel" rather than "coerce," the histori-
cal evidence suggests that the Framers were concerned about purposive,
governmental coercion rather than compulsion in any broad, empirical
sense." The question in a self-incrimination case is not, after all,
whether S should be blamed for her act of confessing but is, instead,
whether the government should be allowed to use the confession. If the
government did not coerce the confession, concluding that S acted
unfreely does not seem to be adequate grounds for exclusion. Of course,
if S's confession is not reliable evidence, it should not be grounds for
convicting her, but the reason is that it is unreliable and not that S acted
unfreely in confessing.
23
This reading of the self-incrimination clause accords with Nozick's
"strict" account of coercion. Conditions 1 and 3 require that the coer-
cive pressure-the threat--come from another person P, who knows that
he is making a threat and who makes the threat in order to get S to do A,
intending that S realize she has been threatened by him. These condi-
tions not only identify a threat that is capable of making S act unfreely
but also fix the responsibility clearly on P.
Condition 4 assumes that coercion implies success, that no coercion
occurs if S resists the pressure of the constraint. While coercive forces
can presumably exist as metaphysical facts in the universe,24 S has not
been coerced until she succumbs to the pressure. Until S speaks, for
example, she has not been coerced to be a witness against herself. While
S might claim a Fifth Amendment "privilege" to refuse to answer ques-
tions, or a criminal defendant might move to quash a subpoena to testify
on the same ground, the privilege is invoked before S is coerced and gives
her legal grounds to resist the coercion.25
Once S's answers, condition 5 requires that her act be, in part, the
result of S's seeking to avoid the threatened consequence. This condition
22. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFri AMENDMENT 43-82 (1968)
(concluding that the abuse of the oath ex officio, an oath that interrogators forced suspects to take,
was largely responsible for development of the right against self-incrimination). The Court has long
used "coercion," "compulsion," and "involuntariness" interchangeably. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252 n.3 (1991) (noting interchangeable usage of "coerced confession"
and "involuntary confession"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470, 474 (1966) (using "coercion"
and "compulsion" interchangeably).
23. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (holding that even ifS's confession is voluntary,
S is constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence of its unreliability).
24. See Westen, supra note 15, at 562; MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (creating the offense of "criminal coercion" defined, roughly, as a threat to take future
detrimental action against someone).
25. These doctrinal trappings are prophylactic in nature, as suggested by the very term
"privilege," which nowhere appears in the Fifth Amendment.
1993]
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is necessary to ensure that S's act is unfree and thus excusable. Suppose
P says, "If you don't give me your necklace, I will not be your friend." It
may be that S had already planned to give P her necklace, because she
knew how much he liked it. While P's proposal is likely a threat, it is
not a threat that moves S to act, and so it is not coercive on Nozick's
account. The most controversial aspect of condition 5-that P's threat
need only be part of the reason S acts-I defer to Part III.
As might be expected, this account works to explain paradigmatic
cases of coercion. Wigmore's classic example is when S confesses after P
threatens her with the rack if she does not confess. 6 Equally classic is
the witness before the grand jury who testifies after being threatened with
contempt of court if she does not testify. In both cases P threatens to do
something to S if she does NA (not answer), and P knows he is making
the threat. The severity of the threatened consequence means that NA is
substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for S than NA without
the threatened consequence. P obviously makes the threat in order to get
S to do A (answer), intending that S realize she's been threatened by P. S
does A. And an external observer would be justified in concluding that
part of S's reason for doing A is to avoid the thing which has been
threatened.
III. EXPLICATING THREAT AND CAUSATION
Having sketched the contours of Nozick's account, I now turn to a
more thorough consideration of two difficulties in applying the account.
In doing that, I will locate Nozick's account in the conceptual frame-
work sketched in Part I.
Nozick's account appears, on the surface, to resemble an Aristotelian,
empirical, view of coercion, albeit a more sophisticated one. It might
appear that an outside observer could simply judge whether, on the basis
of P's and S's behavior, the conditions are met. But because there will be
no coercion unless P threatens S (condition 1), we need to know what
sort of proposal by P constitutes a threat. And because the notion of a
threat may have an inherent normative dimension, Nozick's account may
stand on at least partly normative foundations. A conception of threat
need not be limited by ordinary language usage. What we call in ordi-
nary language a "promise" can be just as coercive as what we call a
"threat." Both threats and promises potentially make NA, in the lan-
guage of condition 2, "substantially less eligible as a course of conduct
for S than NA without the threatened consequence."
In effect, the problem is distinguishing between offers and threats.
Clearly, the prospect of the rack will undoubtedly make silence substan-
tially less eligible as a course of conduct than answering. An offer, too, is
26. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 824 (1923).
[Vol. 5: 79
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intended to make a certain course of action more eligible than its con-
verse, but we do not typically think of an offer as a threat. While P's
proposal to pay S ten times the fair value of her services may make refus-
ing P's bidding substantially less eligible than acceding, P has hardly
threatened S. If we want an account of coercion that ascribes responsi-
bility to P rather than S, we should require that P has made S do A
despite S's relatively strong desire not to do A, not that P has made A
attractive enough that S decides freely that she wants to do it." On this
view, a proposal is a threat only when it makes (or promises to make) S's
condition worse; and it is an offer when it makes (or promises to make)
S's condition better.2"
That much is easy; the difficult question is "worse than what?"
Assume S needs money, her family heirloom necklace is worth $10,000,
and P proposes to pay $5,000. P's proposal makes S's condition worse
than it would have been had P offered fair value, but that does not seem
sufficient to make P's offer a threat. On the other hand, if P says,
"Unless you give me your necklace, I will no longer be your friend," that
seems to be a threat, at least if S wants P to be her friend. How can we
distinguish the two?
Any conception of "threat" requires a baseline by which to measure
whether P's proposal promises to leave S worse off if she does NA than
she would have been without the proposal. In order to know how S
would have done without the proposal, we must find some way to mea-
sure S's baseline expectations-that is, the future she, or we, would pro-
ject for her. But because "expectation" is multiply ambiguous, our
conception of the appropriate baseline will split three ways: between
empirical/statistical, phenomenological, and normative/moral. First, it
can be an empirical or, in Joel Feinberg's useful terms, a statistical pre-
diction.29 The inquiry here considers prevailing social norms and cus-
toms, as well as laws of nature in making an objective judgment of S's
likely future in the absence of P's proposal. If most people in society X
would rescue a stranger who is drowning (assuming minimal risk to the
rescuer), that statistical likelihood becomes part of the baseline. P's pro-
posal to rescue S only if she surrenders her necklace is, then, a threat
because it makes the consequence of S's keeping her necklace worse than
it would have been if P had done what was statistically likely-rescue
S.30 Of course, society Y might have a different statistical baseline, in
27. For an illuminating discussion of the conceptual distinction between offers and threats, see
Nozick, supra note 14, at 128-35.
28. See, e.g., FRANKFURT, supra note 20, at 31; Nozick, supra note 14, at 112.
29. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 219 (1986).
30. Larry Crocker argues that this is not a threat because P does not threaten an evil
consequence. CROCKER, supra note 11, at 16. But I think "threat" should be defined more broadly.
See, e.g., FRANKFURT, supra note 20, at 33 (including within definition of "threat" when P exploits
S's dependency and need by demanding an unfair or improper price for satisfying S's needs).
1993]
9
Thomas: A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
which P's proposal would be an offer rather than a threat.
In the case of P's proposal to pay a low amount for the necklace, if we
assume that P is not statistically expected to offer S fair value, then his
proposal, albeit undesirable, does not leave her worse off than she might
statistically have expected. But the statistical baseline seems out of place
in the other necklace case in which P says he will no longer be S's friend
unless she gives him the necklace. Whether or not it is statistically likely
that friends continue to be friends, surely what counts more here is how S
perceives the situation. In Alan Wertheimer's terms this is aphenomeno-
logical baseline.3" If S wants P to continue to be her friend, P's proposal
that S choose between the necklace and his friendship feels like a threat
because, from S's perspective, the consequence of keeping her necklace is
now worse than it would have been absent P's proposal.32
However, neither the phenomenological nor the statistical baseline
works to produce an intuitively acceptable result in cases where what is
either statistically likely or phenomenologically anticipated in a given
society conflicts with what is morally expected, whether by that society's
standards or by some transcendental norm. The classic example is
Nozick's slave case.33 Here, P beats his slave S once a day for reasons
unconnected with S's behavior. One day P proposes not to beat S if S
does A. S's statistical and phenomenological baselines would both con-
strue P's proposal as an offer; having a chance to avoid the beating makes
S better off than an observer would have statistically predicted or than S
perceived she would be. But as it is morally wrong to beat (or own)
slaves, P's proposal leaves S in an inferior position than she morally
should occupy (not being owned or beaten). On a moral baseline, P is
threatening to beat S unless she does A.
A combination of moral and phenomenological baselines may encom-
pass the positive liberty requirement that S know crucial information
about the choice she faces. Consider again the case in which P knows a
rescue squad is only moments away when he tells S he will save her from
drowning only if she gives him her necklace (A), and assume that neither
the statistical nor the moral baseline would include P's rescuing S.
Assume further that P is morally required to tell S that rescue is immi-
31. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 207. Nozick uses "normal and expected course of events" to
describe the appropriate baseline, noting that "expected" is "meant to shift between or straddle
predicted and morally required." See Nozick, supra note 14, at 112. Yet later in the paper he uses a
phenomenological baseline when a type of consequence "is itself part of the normal and expected
course of events" if S does NA. The example he gives is that P's proposal to punish S for theft is a
threat "even though in the normal and expected course of events [S] gets punished for theft" because
the act of punishment makes the consequence of S's stealing worse against the "background of the
normal and expected course of events minus this act of punishment." Id. at 117-18.
32. Consider Larry Crocker's hypothetical: P proposes to set S's inheritance at $10,000 after P's
will previously set it at $100,000. Crocker finds this a threat "independently of whether [S] had any
right to the $100,000" (presumably, though, only when S knew the contents of P's former will).
CROCKER, supra note 11, at 17.
33. Nozick, supra note 14, at 115-16.
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nent. The baseline question now is whether P's proposal makes the con-
sequence of keeping her necklace worse than if P did what was morally
expected of him. While the consequence of S's doing NA is not actually
worse if P refrains from telling her (since she'll be rescued anyway), S
would perceive the consequence of doing NA as the likelihood of her
drowning. Thus, the absence of crucial information can turn what is not
otherwise a threat into a threat.34
But the other aspect of positive liberty--ensuring a minimal level of
rational autonomy-does not appear to be included in any of the base-
lines. Recall the S who compulsively accedes to any request; and suppose
P tells her that he will give her $5,000 for the necklace (worth $10,000).
If S had the capacity to refuse, P's proposal would be an offer, albeit a
low one. S's inability to refuse adds nothing to the analysis unless P
knows of S's malady and is seeking to exploit it.35 In the absence of such
circumstances, it is unlikely that P is morally or statistically expected to
offer her fair value. And her incapacity would, if anything, make the
phenomenological baseline even less likely to make the proposal a threat;
while S would feel unfree to refuse, she presumably would not resent P
for it, but rather would regret her psychological condition.
Nozick concludes that when different baselines produce different
results, the right baseline to use may be the one that encompasses the
future that S prefers, whether or not she should statistically expect it.36
In the slave case, S would prefer not to be beaten; since the moral base-
line is the only one that includes this as part of S's expected future, it is
the one by which we should decide whether P has threatened S.37 In the
friendship-or-necklace case, the phenomenological baseline might gov-
ern, because S presumably would prefer not to have to choose between
her friends and her jewelry, whether or not she has any moral or statisti-
cal reason to expect such a world.
Ultimately, despite its superficially empirical appearance, Nozick's
34. This is certainly the critical premise of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed
infra. See also George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of
Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 330-31 (arguing that the law should "assur[e] that a person
who confesses does so with as complete an understanding of his tactical position as possible"). But it
is not true that all cases of withheld information are threats. If P offers $5,000 when he thinks S's
necklace is worth $10,000, P's proposal would not be a threat because, in our society, it is neither
statistically, morally, nor phenomenologically expected that an offeror volunteer his belief about the
value of the object in question. That is why I use "crucial" in the text to describe the withheld
information. Information is "crucial," I think, when it might affect S's decision and when P has
privileged access to it. That would be true when P withholds the information about the rescue squad
from the drowning S, but not (typically) in the low offer case as S has her own opinion about the
value of the necklace. The low offer case might be a threat if S has a reason to think P's opinion is
far superior to hers, or if P affirmatively deceives S in some way.
35. If P is seeking to exploit S's malady, the threat is the exploitation, not the lack of capacity
itself. See, e.g., Connelly v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (contrasting P exploiting the mental
illness of S through interrogation with P listening to a mentally ill S who volunteers a confession).
36. Nozick, supra note 14, at 116.
37. Id. at 116.
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account cannot be entirely divorced from a normative view of coercion.
Although the statistical and phenomenological baselines are empirical in
nature, if the moral baseline would produce a different result, and if S
would prefer the morally expected course of events, Nozick contemplates
defining threats by the moral baseline. Wertheimer presses further on
the importance of the moral baseline. He argues that while coercion
claims are "contextual" and have "variable descriptive and normative
force," it is only (or principally) the moral baseline that distinguishes
between "coercive and noncoercive proposals in cases which involve the
ascription of responsibility."38
I do not believe Nozick's account is similarly limited (or, in Wert-
heimer's term, "moralized"). It seems to me that some (perhaps most) of
the cases of coercion under Nozick's account can be explained without
recourse to an explicitly normative baseline. To the extent morality
influences what is statistically or phenomenologically expected, all the
baselines turn on moral concepts; but this is not what Wertheimer means
by his "moralized" theory of coercion.39 The difference is crucial for a
claim that interrogation without additional threats can be coercive.
Wertheimer argues that, under a moralized theory of coercion, the state
may be morally permitted to interrogate suspects within certain limits
and that the proposal to continue interrogation (within those limits) is
not a proposal to make S worse off than she is entitled to be.' But it will
be otherwise, as I will argue later, under the other two baselines.
However we define threat, condition 5 requires that the threat be part
of the reason S does A. The difficulty is determining when S acts in order
to avoid the proposed penalty. The easy cases are those in which we
have evidence that S already intended to do A, and thus was not moved
significantly by P's threat; or when, conversely, there is no real possibility
of an independent motivation for S's action, as when S confesses rather
than endure the rack. The hard cases are those in which S has poten-
tially multiple motives. Consider again the necklace example: P states to
S, "Unless you give me your necklace, I will no longer be your friend."
Does the coercion analysis change if she surrenders the necklace in part
because she knows how much P wants the necklace and looks forward to
seeing the pleasure on P's face?
Note that S formed the intention to give P the necklace only after he
38. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 212 & 217. At one point Wertheimer states that the moral
baseline "does most of the important work" in determining coercion when S's responsibility for
doing A is at issue, but in other places he seems to assume it does all the work. Compare id. at 217
with 215-16 & 242. Tony Honor6 also reads Wertheimer to say that P's proposal must be morally
wrong in this context. Tony Honor6, A Theory of Coercion, 10 OxFoRD J. oF LEGAL STUDIES, 94,
97-98 (1990).
39. Wertheimer notes these "connections" among the three baselines, WERTHEIMER, supra note
2, at 208, yet still uses only the moral baseline to distinguish threats from offers. Id. at 242.
40. Id. at 216.
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threatened her, a sequence Hart and Honor6 consider significant.4 In
addition, I believe S would feel that P forced her to surrender her neck-
lace, despite the pleasure she might derive. Surely she felt the constraint
of P's proposal in forming her intention to give him the necklace. That
constraint operated as a proposed penalty on her freedom to keep the
necklace, and she would likely perceive it as the reason she gave in to P's
request, disregarding her other reasons.
On this view, it is necessary only that part of the reason S does A is a
desire to avoid the threatened penalty. This is Nozick's condition 5.
Indeed, once we know that S did A after being threatened with a rela-
tively substantial penalty, a sort of quasi-presumption exists that condi-
tion 5 has been satisfied. This presumption can be rebutted only by
showing that S acted not just out of mixed or multiple motives, but
wholly from a motive distinct from the desire to avoid the penalty. This
would be the case, for example, if S had previously decided to give P the
necklace as a present.
Yet there is something dissatisfying about concluding that S was
coerced when she had an additional motive for doing A. If we could
quantify S's reasons for doing A, as Nozick has observed, we could
switch from a yes-no "classificatory notion of coercion to a quantitative
one," where P's threat would be some fraction of S's total reason for
doing A.42 A quantitative notion of coercion contemplates a coercion
spectrum from S being 0-coerced to S being 1-coerced, encompassing an
infinite series of gradations. Even "in the absence of precise weights, one
might begin to speak of someone's being partially coerced, slightly
coerced, almost fully coerced into doing something, and so forth."43
A coercion theory admitting of degrees of freedom has a strong intui-
tive appeal. We have all felt pressure to do something from proposals
that left us feeling slightly less free than we would have felt in the
absence of the proposal. But this experience felt different than when we
acted almost entirely because of the threat behind the proposal. An
account that recognizes this difference would capture something very
important about the concept of being free (or unfree) to act.
Developing a theory of degrees of coercion is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper. Pragmatically, it suffers from obvious problems. We
cannot see inside of S's head and, even if we could, it is hard to imagine
how we might quantify her reasons for acting.' As the Supreme Court
has noted, "It is difficult to tell with certainty what motivates a suspect to
speak. A suspect's confession may be traced to factors as disparate as 'a
pre-arrest event such as a visit with a minister,' or an intervening event
41. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORfi, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 53 & 55 (1961).
42. Nozick, supra note 14, at 135.
43. Id.
44. When Nozick raises this issue, he admits he is indulging in a "bit of science fiction." Id.
1993]
13
Thomas: A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
such as the exchange of words respondent had with his father."4 Even
more pragmatically, judges faced with a challenge to a confession must
decide whether to admit the confession. It is difficult to imagine how the
knowledge, if we had it, that S was "a bit" coerced into confessing could
be made part of that judicial determination.'
Thus, I will continue to use coercion in its categorical sense, recogniz-
ing that borderline cases will always be troublesome. With the issues of
threat and causation more fully explicated, I turn now to the self-incrimi-
nation jurisprudence. My goal here is to show how the cases fit with a
version of Nozick's account which takes seriously the positive liberty
notion of the importance of information.
IV. JUDICIAL AccouNTs OF SELF-INCRIMINATION COERCION
Not all confession cases involve interrogation. Consider a case where
a police chief offers to keep a lynch mob at bay if S confesses. I believe
most people would intuitively find this proposal a threat, whether or not
it is statistically likely that the police chief will protect her. The protec-
tion that P offers is part of S's morally expected baseline (and probably
her phenomenologically expected baseline as well), which makes it a
threat for P to condition protection on S doing A.47
A threshold issue presents itself in interrogation cases. Most of the
cases lack the kind of explicit proposal contemplated by Nozick's
account and represented in my hypothetical cases. Although the early
cases often involved explicit threats-confess or face a specific conse-
quence-English and American courts for at least two hundred years
have consistently found those confessions involuntary and thus inadmis-
sible.48 Thus, most cases from the modern era involve nothing more than
interrogation. Perhaps a police officer who does nothing but ask ques-
tions is not intentionally making a threat. Addressing this issue will
demonstrate the utility of the baseline analysis; we can apply what we
learned about baselines rather than make linguistic or intuitive
arguments.
Initially it must be true that P is making a proposal. A good example
45. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
220 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (citation omitted).
46. Once the confession is admitted, the notion of partial coercion suggests letting the jury hear
the circumstances that produced the confession. In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), the
trial judge had ruled Crane's confession voluntary, and thus admissible, but the defendant sought to
introduce evidence about the interrogation to support his claim that the confession was false. His
claim could be understood to be that he was sufficiently coerced to make a false confession, even
though he was not coerced in the classificatory sense. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that
Crane should be permitted to introduce this evidence of "partial coercion."
47. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (held coercive). See also Arizona v. Fulminante,
III S.Ct. 1246 (1991) (promise of government informer to protect S from other inmates if S
confessed held coercive).
48. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-61 (1897) (discussing at length criminal law
treatises on interrogation as well as English and American cases).
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of a constraint that does not contain a proposal is the routine mechanics
of arrest and custody. These police actions leave S worse off than she
would have been in their absence.49 But because there is no proposal
here-P is not saying to S, "if you do NA, I will continue to hold you"-
there is no threat and thus no coercion on Nozick's account. 50
Interrogation, however, contains a proposal that, while usually
implicit, is nonetheless real: P implies that he will continue the interroga-
tion if S does not answer to his satisfaction.51 Moreover, P must know
that he is making this implicit proposal; indeed, P would gladly stop the
interrogation if S gave answers that satisfied P.
To be sure, interrogation may contain proposals other than that of
continued interrogation, and I will consider that question later in the
paper. For the moment, however, I consider only the proposal to con-
tinue questioning and, thus, by "interrogation" mean questioning that
gives rise to the inference that it will continue indefinitely. One or two
questions might not contain the implication, and thus would not satisfy
the threat requirement of condition 1-for example, a police officer, ask-
ing someone at the scene of the crime whether she saw anything, might
only intend to ask that question and move on. The matter is, of course,
complex, and must be considered in the whole context. It is not only the
number of questions that must be considered but also the kind of ques-
tions, where they are asked, whether S is under arrest, and P's tone of
voice. A single question asked of an arrested S in an interrogation room
in a menacing tone of voice might contain an implicit proposal to con-
tinue interrogation.
Assuming, however, that interrogation as I have defined it is taking
place, P is making a proposal to continue questioning until S confesses,
and the baseline question is whether this proposal puts S in a worse posi-
tion if she does NA than she should or would have occupied without the
proposal. Even if Wertheimer is right that a moral baseline does not
classify P's interrogation as a threat, a "non-moralized" theory that con-
sidered the other baselines might so classify it. This might seem to
invoke the difficult empirical question of whether S should statistically
have expected continuing interrogation, or the even trickier phenomeno-
logical question of whether S actually expected continuing questioning.
But I believe that these inquiries are unnecessary.
Recall that the implicit proposal is, "I will continue interrogation if
49. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
50. It is also true, of course, that the routine mechanics of arrest and custody would typically fail
to satisfy condition 3-P acts in order to get S to do A-even if they somehow satisfied condition 1.
51. Despite Wertheimer's conclusion on his moralized account that interrogation is not typically
a threat, he agrees that interrogation contains a proposal to continue if the suspect does not confess.
WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 216. In Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520 (1968) (per
curiam), for example, S testified that he confessed after over two hours of interrogation because "I
knew they weren't going to leave me alone until I did."
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you refuse to answer in a way that satisfies me." Drawing on Harry
Frankfurt, we may evaluate P's proposal to intervene in a course of
events by "compar[ing] the course of events when P intervenes according
to the terms of his proposal with what will happen if this intervention is
subtracted from that course of events." '52 But in the absence of the pro-
posal, there would be no interrogation by definition, and S would obvi-
ously be better off. Hence P's proposal is a threat.
The question is easy because the proposal to continue interrogation
exhausts the ways S's baseline can be worsened by continued interroga-
tion. P must be interrogating S in order to propose continued interroga-
tion. In contrast, if P says to S, "Give me your necklace or I will file a
lawsuit to get it," P's proposal does not exhaust the ways in which S's
baseline might be worsened by the filing of a lawsuit. P might be statisti-
cally expected to sue S without making the proposal, or S might live in
fear of being sued at any moment. Not so in the interrogation situation,
where P's very proposal to continue interrogation exhausts the ways in
which S might expect to be interrogated. It follows trivially that under
either a statistical or phenomenological baseline, P's proposal to continue
interrogation must be viewed as a threat.
Indeed the Supreme Court has consistently viewed interrogation as
coercive. In an 1897 case, for example, S began answering after an inter-
rogation that consisted only of the detective saying, "Your position is
rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office, and he made a
statement that he saw you do the murder."53 The Court implicitly con-
cluded that this was a threat when it held that S's response was involun-
tary.54 Since then, the Court has never wavered from the view that
interrogation, even of relatively modest length, is coercive. 5 And in
Miranda v. Arizona the Court described in detail the threat implicit in
interrogation.56
52. FRANKFURT, supra note 20, at 31.
53. See Brain v. United States 168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897).
54. Id. at 562-63. For a more detailed discussion of Brain, see Thomas & Bilder, supra note 4, at
253-55.
55. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) (confession held involuntary when
made after interrogation of about two hours and fifteen minutes).
56. 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (noting that "an interrogation environment is created for no
purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner"). The Court also quoted
at length from a police interrogation manual:
Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, [the interrogator] must rely on an
oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He must interrogate steadily and without relent,
leaving the subject no prospect of surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him
with his inexorable will to obtain the truth .... In a serious case, the interrogation may
continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no respite from the
atmosphere of domination.
Id. at 451 (quoting O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956)).
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A. Pre-Miranda Voluntariness Cases
In this section, I discuss Supreme Court cases raising issues relating to
the Nozick account, roughly in chronological order. Because Miranda is
widely viewed as a watershed case, I will use it as a way of organizing the
chronology. I want to show that while Nozick's account makes consis-
tent sense of the Court's jurisprudence, only since Miranda has the Court
begun to emphasize the positive liberty dimension of coercion (at least
with respect to misinformation). Before Miranda, the Court relied on a
more empirical analysis, creating a rebuttable quasi-presumption that
only a coercive threat would cause a confession.
As the Court did not make the self-incrimination clause binding on
state courts until two years before Miranda was decided, the focus of the
Court's numerous pre-Miranda state confession cases was the more gen-
eral requirement of due process of law.57 Indeed, the due process inquiry
was usually to test confessions not for coercion or compulsion but for
voluntariness, terminology drawn from the common law. The Court
made clear that due process was violated when an involuntary confession
was used in evidence against the accused.58
But what is an involuntary confession? As Louis Michael Seidman has
observed, "Because the Court lacked a coherent conception of free will, it
never managed to articulate a general theory that explained what made
particular police techniques unacceptable. The result was that the deci-
sions of cases tended to be ad hoc, unpredictable and apparently unprin-
cipled."59 The Court did identify a long list of factors ranging from
physical brutality to falsely aroused sympathy.' The difficulty, however,
is that the Court's list made "everything relevant and nothing
determinative."61
Justice Frankfurter best described the nature of the pre-Miranda
inquiry in Culombe v. Connecticut, while hinting at its near impossibility:
The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was volunta-
57. Compare Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying self-incrimination clause to states
and holding that a witness in state court had a privilege to refuse to answer questions that might link
him to a crime) with Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (noting as one ground for
inadmissibility that the statement was obtained by "techniques and methods offensive to due
process").
58. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941). For an excellent study of the due
process confessions rule and the self-incrimination clause, see Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored
Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary
Confession Rule, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992).
59. Seidman, supra note 12, at 163.
60. Other factors included isolation from family, friends, or counsel; trickery during the
interrogation; whether the accused is provided with "basic amenities, such as food or cigarettes"; the
length of questioning; and the youthfulness, low intelligence, mental, and physical condition of the
accused. See CHARLES H. WHrrEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 369-
74 (3d ed. 1993).
61. Joseph Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over
Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243 (1986).
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rily or involuntarily made involves, at the least, a three-phased pro-
cess. First, there is the business of finding the crude, historical facts,
the external "phenomenological" occurrences and events surround-
ing the confession. Second, because the concept of "voluntariness"
is one which concerns a mental state, there is the imaginative recrea-
tion, largely inferential, of internal, "psychological" fact. Third,
there is the application to this psychological fact of standards for
judgment informed by the larger legal conceptions ordinarily char-
acterized as rules of law but which, also, comprehend both induc-
tion from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances.62
Once a decision was made in the trial court, appellate judges were
faced with the prospect of combing the record in search of the dozens of
potentially relevant facts by which to evaluate this "imaginative recrea-
tion" and application of a fact-dependent rule of law. It is not surprising
that the Supreme Court was deluged with certiorari petitions asserting
that lower court judges had reached the wrong conclusion, ignored rele-
vant facts, or misconstrued the facts found. As an example of the futility
of Frankfurter's effort to clarify matters, only one other Justice joined his
opinion announcing the Court's judgment in Culombe.63 Moreover, in
applying his articulated framework to the facts of the case before the
Court, Frankfurter used 19 pages to describe the phenomenological facts
and 15 pages to infer psychological facts and apply the legal standard. 
6
Is Nozick's account more helpful? The general shape of the pre-
Miranda confessions doctrine is consistent with Nozick's account. The
common law concern was with the use of "threats, .... promises," and
"improper influence" to cause S to confess when that was not S's free and
voluntary choice.65 While the meaning of "improper influence" is not
very clear, many promises in an interrogation context carry an implicit
threat. If P says to S, "Confess and I will recommend leniency," S can
read this "promise" to entail the threat that if she does not confess, P will
deal with her harshly.
Building on my earlier claim that a proposal to continue interrogation
is always a threat, whether interrogation satisfies the Nozick account
ultimately turns on the condition 5 question of causation. Any confes-
sion case necessarily satisfies condition 4 (S does A). Almost all interro-
gations would also satisfy conditions 2 and 3. With respect to condition
3, once the questioning met my definition of interrogation, it would
almost always be true that P makes the threat of continued interrogation
in order to get S to answer, intending that S realize that she's been
62. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961) (opinion announcing Court's judgment by
Frankfurter, J.) (joined only by Stewart, J.).
63. Id. at 568.
64. Id. at 603-21 and 621-35.
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threatened by P. Condition 2 would also be satisfied because NA with
P's threat of continued interrogation is rendered substantially less eligible
as a course of conduct for S than NA without the threat. P is an author-
ity figure who asks questions while expecting an answer. Indeed, if NA
were not rendered substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for S
in the face of interrogation, police would not value interrogation as much
as they (evidently) do.
But condition 5 is more of a problem. It is not obvious that every S
confesses during interrogation in part to avoid (or lessen the likelihood
of) continued interrogation. S might confess to clear her conscience, to
save someone else from suspicion, or because she is proud of what she
has done. The degree of pressure on S is clearly relevant. A single ques-
tion asked early in the interrogation-"were you at the scene of the
crime?"-is less likely to justify the conclusion that S confessed in part
out of a desire to avoid the next question than if asked after thirty-six
hours of questioning or a series of questions accompanied by beatings."
If the pressure is sufficiently intense-the threat of the rack, for exam-
ple-everyone concedes that it renders coerced any confession that fol-
lows the threat. While another motive might possibly be S's principal
reason for acting, as external observers we are entitled to believe that it
was S's desire to avoid the rack that caused S to confess. The same infer-
ence is justified if P denies S food, water, sleep, or needed medication for
a period that would cause the external observer to conclude that S exper-
ienced a physical deprivation.
The difficult problem is the interrogation that contains no threats of
physical torture and no physical deprivation. Here P asks S questions
designed to get her to admit guilt; S does not answer to P's satisfaction
and P continues to question her. Is this any different, in terms of
whether S answers to avoid the proposed consequence, from the physical
deprivation cases?
I believe there is no material difference. If interrogation is a threat
that makes S's condition worse than it was prior to the proposal, an
external observer would be justified in believing that, at some point in an
interrogation of sufficient length, S answers in order to avoid the conse-
quence of additional interrogation. This, of course, leaves unanswered
where that point is. Justice White has argued that a court should not
presume coercion if the first question P asks S is only whether she has
anything to say.6 7 It is difficult to argue with White's assertion if we
ignore other potentially coercive influences by assuming, for example,
66. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 hours of continual questioning held
coercive); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (brutal beatings used as threat held coercive).
Moreover, interrogation will likely produce more pressure if P strips S of his clothes and keeps him
naked for several hours. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (confession held
involuntary).
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 533 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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that S is not under arrest and that P asks the question of her while col-
lecting general information at the scene of the crime. However, it is
equally clear that at some point during questioning a threshold will be
reached, and we will be entitled to infer coercion as the cause of S's
confession.
In the early cases reviewing state convictions, the Court seemed
inclined to indulge the very strong assumption that a confession was not
coerced by interrogation unless "the inducement to speak was such that
there is a fair risk the confession is false."68 This inquiry is a more
restrictive version of Nozick's condition 2--call it 2'-"NA with the
threatened consequence is rendered so ineligible as a course of conduct
for S that most people would confess falsely rather than endure it."
Nozick's original condition 2 requires only that NA be rendered substan-
tially less eligible. A 2' threat that would make most people confess
falsely is, I think, a threat of much greater coerciveness. Using 2' rather
than 2 would produce a much smaller universe of coerced statements.
But the Court made less use of 2' than some of its dicta would suggest.
Rather than use 2' as a way of restricting the universe of coerced state-
ments, the Court tended to use it as an objective, albeit stringent, test of
the satisfaction of the difficult causation requirement of condition 5. If 2'
is satisfied, then there is a very strong presumption that 5 is too. In
Brown v. Mississippi,69 for example, the defendants confessed only after
brutal beatings and the promise of more until they made the statement P
wanted them to make. This interrogation technique satisfies 2' and,
therefore, 5.
To decide whether 2' had an independent role to play in the Court's
pre-Miranda jurisprudence, we would need to discover cases finding no
coercion where 5 but not 2' is satisfied. One candidate is Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia,v° but it does not provide a clear-cut example. Lisenba was sub-
jected to two lengthy interrogations without confessing. After the second
interrogation ended, he suggested to a deputy sheriff that if they went out
to eat, "I'll tell you the story."7 Following supper and cigars, Lisenba
made damaging admissions, which he later repeated in response to ques-
tioning by the district attorney.
The Lisenba interrogation might satisfy 5. Perhaps Lisenba confessed
in part to avoid an anticipated third interrogation. Moreover, if P denied
food to Lisenba, that would make the threatened consequence more
severe and thus make it more likely that 5 was satisfied. But a plausible
case can also be made the other way. The state produced testimony that
68. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 214, 236 (1941).
69. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
70. 314 U.S. 219 (1941). Although the Court stated that condition 2' was part of the inquiry, the
facts of the case could be construed as satisfying neither condition 5 nor 2'. Id. at 236.
71. Id. at 232.
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Lisenba was not denied food.72 And Lisenba's offer to tell the story if
they went out to eat came after the second interrogation ended, when he
was alone with a single officer who was, apparently, not questioning him.
Lisenba had endured two lengthy interrogations without confessing.
Finally, Lisenba testified that he confessed only because his accomplice
had confessed. These factors could be read as indicating that Lisenba
confessed not to get food or avoid a third interrogation but only because
he saw no point in continuing to deny his involvement in the crime.
Under this reading, 5 is not satisfied, and Lisenba's confession would not
be coerced even under Nozick's account.
It is unclear whether the Court ever took seriously condition 2', other
than as an easy way to satisfy 5. In any event, 2' had a very short life.
Three years after Lisenba, the Court omitted reference to 2', instead
stressing that the coercion inquiry turned on whether the interrogation
had deprived S of the "mental freedom" to decide whether to answer P's
questions.73 Later cases disavowed a legal standard that "took into
account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity" in favor of one
that asked whether the confession was "freely self-determined."
'7 4
This focus on whether a confession is "freely self-determined" is con-
sistent with, and arguably equivalent to, Nozick's condition 5. If part of
the reason S answers is to avoid P's threat of continued interrogation, S's
confession would not be freely self-determined, even if the consequence
of NA was not so awful that most people would falsely confess rather
than endure it. As the Court had implicitly rejected 2' by 1961, the prob-
lem was not epistemological but practical-how to determine when S
answered in part to avoid the continued interrogation.75
Though the Court never acknowledged it, I believe that by the 1950s
most Justices recognized the practical futility of a Frankfurter-type
inquiry. I also think the Court recognized that coercion could be found
on evidence that only part of S's reason for answering was to avoid the
72. The state's witnesses testified that Lisenba ate sandwiches at supper time. Id. at 232.
73. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
74. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961). The Court continued to use "overbear
the will" as part of the voluntariness test, id. at 544, thus creating a test that was seriously under-
inclusive. There would surely be a large number of confessions not "freely self-determined" where
the suspects' will was not "overborne"-at least if "overbear the will" entails a more strict causation
requirement than Nozick's condition 5.
My claim, however, is that the Court during the 1950s and 1960s began to focus on the "freely
self-determined" aspect of the test (or, alternatively, that the Court interpreted "overbear the will"
to mean something like Nozick's condition 5). See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)
(confession involuntary when P told S he could not contact anyone until he gave a statement).
75. I should be clear. I am not claiming that the Court in its due process confessions cases
always analyzed involuntariness claims in a way consistent with Nozick's account. The broader
nature of the due process inquiry implicated values other than the right not to be coerced. See, e.g.,
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (noting "complex of values" and stressing defendant's
lack of mental capacity in holding confession involuntary). Rather, my claim is that the Court never
consistently applied a due process test that is narrower than the Nozick account, such as including a
more restrictive condition 2'.
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continued interrogation. Moreover, I believe the Court in effect began to
apply the quasi-presumption identified in Part III. Because interroga-
tion, as I have defined it, meets the first three conditions, if S confesses,
then 5 will be met unless evidence exists that S acted from a different
motive than the constraint P placed on her. This quasi-presumption is
consistent with the way I read Nozick's account. Lacking a window into
S's head or some objective reason to believe that S wanted to answer, an
external observer would reasonably assume that a response to P's interro-
gation was caused at least in part by S's desire to end the interrogation.
This quasi-presumption was arguably rebutted in Lisenba because S
offered to discuss the matter after the interrogation had ended and later
testified that he confessed only because his accomplice had confessed.
Thus, Lisenba and most other pre-Miranda cases that found confessions
admissible can be read as rebutting a quasi-presumption that S does A in
part because of the threat.76
B. Miranda v. Arizona
I have argued that by the 1950s the Court was applying something
very much like Nozick's account to self-incrimination cases by viewing
interrogation as a threat and by indulging a quasi-presumption that an
answer given during interrogation was caused, in part, by the interroga-
tion. If I am right, then Miranda was not the revolution in Supreme
Court doctrine some have said it was.77 Under my reading of the pre-
Miranda cases, the major change in Supreme Court doctrine wrought by
Miranda was to standardize the means by which the presumption of
76. Out of a universe of roughly 40 confession cases between the Supreme Court's first review of
a state confession case and Miranda, I found only six cases where the Court reached the
voluntariness issue and held the confession inadmissible. Of the five cases in addition to Lisenba,
none referred to a condition 2' and all but one can be explained as failing to meet condition 5, at least
under the Court's reading of the facts. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958) (noting
that P told S he did not have to answer questions); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 428 (1958)
(noting that district attorney told S that "she did not have to answer any questions and that she was
entitled to consult with an attorney"); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (stressing that one co-
defendant's confession was made not to police but to visiting parole officials with whom S was
attempting to negotiate a deal in exchange for confession, id. at 167; noting that confession of second
defendant came the morning after he was informed of first defendant's confession and advised to
"sleep on it," id. at 168); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (noting that confession ultimately
used at trial came after P told S that "anything he might say would be used against him and that he
should not 'make any statement unless he voluntarily wanted to' "). The one case that does not fit
this description is Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), where the Court acknowledged sporadic
interrogation over several days, limited food, solitary-like confinement, and threats by an assistant
sheriff, yet found the confession voluntary.
77. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Court's decision was "at odds with American and English legal history"). It is hardly novel to
claim that Miranda was less than a revolution. The Miranda majority itself noted its holding was
"not an innovation in our jurisprudence." Id. at 442. I suspect, however, that the change wrought
by Miranda in the lower courts was more revolutionary because they were not applying the quasi-
presumption in the same way as the Supreme Court's pre.Miranda cases. See Seidman, supra note
12, at 163 (voluntariness "approach left the rights at stake substantially underenforced"). Thus,
Miranda was likely an attempt by the Supreme Court to force the lower courts to follow what I have
called the quasi-presumption in favor of finding coercion during interrogation.
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coercion could be rebutted: if a suspect receives a standard set of warn-
ings, then a quasi-presumption of coercion will be rebutted. I will argue
that implicit in the Court's reliance on a warning is a move towards a
positive liberty conception of coercion. Finally, I will argue that when
we view the Miranda warnings under a phenomenological baseline
approach, we have reason to see the warnings themselves as coercive.
Miranda, in effect, held that condition 5 is satisfied in every case
involving custodial interrogation unless P gives the prescribed warnings
and obtains a waiver. Many have argued that Miranda's presumption of
coercion is over-inclusive.78 Justice White, for example, argued in dis-
sent that an initial question of "Do you have anything to say?" is very
unlikely to coerce a confession. If we ignore the effect of custody and
view the only threat as that of continued interrogation, I am inclined to
agree.79 There is no reason to believe, for example, that an S who is
among bystanders at the scene of the crime answers that question for fear
of continued interrogation.
On this view, Miranda's over-inclusiveness results not from some flaw
in the quasi-presumption of causation, but from a trivially flawed defini-
tion of interrogation. Interrogation, viewed by itself, can be a threat
under the baseline analysis only if the questioning creates an inference of
continued questioning.8" Of course, the persistent theme of Miranda was
that the interrogation cannot be viewed as distinct from the custody, and
for the moment I want to assume the Court was right in finding that any
custodial questioning is a threat. The examples the Court culled from
police manuals serve to demonstrate that P makes this threat in order to
get S to answer, and intending that S realize she's been threatened."1 The
pressure generated by the police manual examples also supports the
quasi-presumption in earlier cases that if S does answer, part of her rea-
son is to avoid the continued interrogation. 2
I think the conceptual difficulty with Miranda is not that the Court
too easily assumed that interrogation is a threat that is part of the cause
of S's answer, but that the Court too easily assumed that a set of pre-
78. See, e.g., Joseph Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985). For an argument that a jurisprudential account of
coercion crucially depends on presumptions, see George C. Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's
Pragmatic View of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117 (1991).
79. For an argument that seeks to justify a finding of coercion in this context, see Thomas &
Bilder, supra note 4, at 273-74 (drawing on Harry Frankfurt's account of coercion; see FRANKFURT,
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, supra note 20, at 11-25; and Three Concepts of Free
Action, id. at 47-57).
80. This is a trivial flaw because most police questioning of any length, even if S is not in
custody, creates an inference that it will continue until S gives answers that satisfy P. Once custody
gets added to the mix, the Miranda assumption about the coercive effect of interrogation may be
right for all but the most innocuous questions. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (1990)
(creating an exception to Miranda for routine booking questions).
81. 384 U.S. at 448-56.
82. See id. at 467 (noting the existence of "inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak").
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scribed warnings would rebut the presumed coercion. The prescribed
warnings tell S that she need not answer, that anything she says can be
used in court against her, and that she is entitled to a lawyer to assist her
in deciding whether to answer."3 The nature of the warnings suggests
that the Court was influenced by the positive liberty conception of coer-
cion that deems S's act unfree if P withholds crucial information. Here,
however, rather than using the positive liberty conception to construct an
entire baseline by which to measure any threat, the Court used it to make
an assumption about how S responds to the threat of custodial interroga-
tion in particular.
The critical assumption underlying Miranda is not, then, that custo-
dial interrogation is always a threat or that it is always part of the reason
S answers. The Court had been using similar assumptions in its later due
process cases. Instead, Miranda's critical change in the coercion analysis
was the positive liberty assumption that knowledge of the "right" to
resist interrogation would mean that P's threat did not play a significant
part in S's decision to answer.8 4 This emphasis on what the warnings
can achieve creates, in effect, a counter-presumption that gives P a regu-
lar, routine way to demonstrate that condition 5 is not satisfied and thus
that any resulting confession is admissible. The most significant effect of
Miranda, ironically, may be to make police interrogation a more certain
enterprise; even if some confessions are lost because suspects occasionally
act on the warnings and remain silent, the confessions that are taken by
complying with Miranda are virtually guaranteed to be admitted into
evidence.8" This explains what others have noticed-that while police
and prosecutors were initially outraged by Miranda, they rather quickly
dropped their opposition and now seem quite content with the Miranda
doctrine.
86
There are actually two ways in which the warnings might lead us to
believe that S was not coerced by P's threat. They might provide a rea-
son to believe that P's threat played no part at all in S's decision to
answer, thus leaving condition 5 unsatisfied. Or the warnings might
diminish the threat. In effect, the warnings tell S that she can stop the
interrogation at any time. If S believes P, it is much harder to find a
threat in the prospect of continued interrogation. 7
83. Id. at 444.
84. If the warnings do not somehow insulate S from the threat of continued interrogation, no
waiver of the Miranda rights would be possible, and the opinion contemplates not only waiver but
also waiver in the absence of counsel. Id. at 475.
85. See Seidman, supra note 12, at 164.
86. See Stephen Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 456 (1987);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRIsIS 28 (1988) (concluding that a "very
strong majority of those surveyed-prosecutors, judges, and police officers-agree that compliance
with Miranda does not present serious problems for law enforcement").
87. Seidman argues that, under Miranda's assumption about the coercive quality of custodial
interrogation, the statement "I do not want a lawyer" in response to a question is compelled.
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While the warnings may diminish the threat of continued interroga-
tion, I believe they may create a new threat. To see this, we must be
precise about what A means in condition 4 ("S does A"). Initially, I
defined "A" to mean "answer P's questions," but I have sometimes used
"confess" interchangeably with "answer" because for most purposes they
are interchangeable. The state would not seek to introduce an answer
unless it was incriminating and thus had at least some of the qualities of a
confession. But many "confessions" are less than a full acknowledge-
ment of guilt. Often S will tell a story that she believes to be exculpatory
or that she thinks minimizes her guilt and shifts most or all of the blame
to someone else. Often, S is wrong in her legal judgment, and the result-
ing statement is tantamount to a full confession. Even if the statement is
not a full confession, the state may want to introduce it to discourage S
from telling a more exculpatory story at trial or to impeach other state-
ments S may have made.
To be precise, A in my adaptation of Nozick's conditions stands for
only an answer to P's questions. But consider why S would give superfi-
cially exculpatory answers after being informed of the disadvantages of
answering P's questions. The only plausible reason is that she thinks she
can gain an advantage-release from custody or a reduced charge. Thus,
while the prospect of continued custody viewed by itself may not be a
threat, the Miranda warnings, ironically, may turn it into a threat. The
Miranda warnings are a ritualistic event that strongly signals P's belief
that S knows something about the crime and is probably guilty. S may
think that if P is giving her Miranda warnings, she has no choice but to
answer if she is to achieve her goal of release or a reduced charge. 8
By giving Miranda warnings, P may be saying to S, "You have the
right to remain silent; if you do, you will pay the penalty of continued
custody under suspicion of crime X." I think this proposal is equally a
threat under the phenomenological baseline approach; S experiences the
proposal as a threat because she wants her future baseline to include
release from custody or a reduced charge. Assuming she answers the
questions because she wants to talk P out of keeping her in custody, she
must believe her release is a realistic possibility.
In a perverse way, S may be more likely to answer when warnings are
given. S now feels the threat of continued custody more acutely than she
did prior to the warnings, and she also likely perceives a greater benefit
from answering. Since P tells her she need not answer, she may think
that her willingness to answer will demonstrate her innocence. So the
Seidman, supra note 12, at 165. But Miranda assumed that the warnings would dispel the threat
inherent in interrogation; under this assumption, the question "Do you want a lawyer?" would not
be coercive. Seidman argues that the second assumption is inconsistent with the first. Id.
88. See Burt, supra note 13, at 188 (arguing that an uncounseled waiver is not "at all responsive
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proposal may look like this: "You do not have to answer; if you do not, I
will continue to assume you are guilty of crime X; if you do, there is a
possibility you can convince me otherwise.'"" Thus, S might "waive"
her Miranda rights because P has given her the warnings.
If Miranda warnings create a new threat, their only value in avoiding
coercion on Nozick's account is if they succeed in rendering S's own will
the source of her actions, and thus blocking condition 5. But how can
this be? S answers, at least in part, because S wants to avoid the
threatened consequence of continued custody without charge reduction.
Not surprisingly, if the Miranda warnings turn continued custody into a
threat (and I think they do under the phenomenological baseline
approach), the warnings cannot counteract the threat; the warnings are
part of the threat. Indeed, the Court's premise that stationhouse custody
is part of the coercive forces operating against S calls into question the
Court's positive liberty assumption that the warnings can sufficiently dis-
pel all threats in that context.
My critique of Miranda warnings as simultaneously enhancing and
ameliorating different threats is open to criticism. I assume that S will
answer after receiving the warnings because she now perceives the threat
of continued custody if she remains silent. This may not always be
empirically true; S may answer because she wants to confess. But this
criticism is empty if one accepts Miranda's basic methodology. Under
Miranda's assumption about the coercive atmosphere of custodial inter-
rogation, it is also true that a particular S may answer because she wants
to confess. It is just as likely that S answers after receiving warnings
because she perceives the new threat posed by silence and custody as that
S answers in the absence of warnings because she feels the threat of con-
tinued interrogation.
Another criticism is that my critique is critically dependent on the
phenomenological baseline. The other two baselines would not seem to
classify as a threat the proposal to continue custody unless S does A. If S
is lawfully under arrest, the police must have probable cause to suspect
her of crime X. For S to convince P that he has made a mistake in the
face of probable cause is not a morally expected outcome, nor is it statis-
tically likely. The whole point to arrest, as compared to a more limited
"stop and frisk,"9 is that arrest constitutes an indefinite curtailment of
S's liberty on the charged crime until some time in the future when the
charge is resolved or the prosecutor or judge intervenes to release S.9 By
89. See Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV.
42, 61 (1968) (noting experimental finding that suggests possibility of positive correlation between
warnings and successful interrogation).
90. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality) (holding that, under facts of case, "stop
and frisk" doctrine would not permit detention of fifteen minutes).
91. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (requiring judicial determination of probable
cause as condition to hold an arrestee in jail).
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hypothesis, her statistical baseline will project continued custody in the
absence of judicial or prosecutorial intervention; likewise, she may mor-
ally expect to be kept in custody if, in fact, she is guilty.
If the phenomenological baseline is not an appropriate measure of
threat, the proposal to continue custody unless S does A may not be a
threat. Yet I think it is appropriate, for two reasons. First, coercion
implies that S experienced a threat, and only the phenomenological base-
line captures that experience. Second, the available empirical data gener-
ally find no significant diminution in the rate of confessions after
Miranda,92 suggesting either that most suspects truly want to answer P's
questions or that some threat survives the warnings. The former seems
unlikely to me, and the latter both explains the empirical data and con-
firms the intuitive view that what feels like a threat is a threat.
If Miranda warnings create a new threat, conditions 2, 4, and 5 are
easily satisfied. The threat of continued custody posed by silence renders
NA substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for S than NA with-
out the threat. If she answers, it seems likely that her decision to answer
is based, in part, on a desire to avoid the threatened consequence of con-
tinued custody under suspicion of crime X.
But condition 3 is a more difficult problem. While one reason to keep
S in custody may be to increase the likelihood that she will confess, and P
clearly gives the warnings in order to render admissible any answers S
may give, should we assume that P intends the warnings plus custody as
a threat? Perhaps 3 is satisfied by focusing on the custody that begins
with the interrogation. By seeking a Miranda waiver from S, P is asking
her to do A. Moreover, he must intend S to perceive that she will remain
in custody under suspicion of crime X until she satisfactorily explains
whatever facts P has accumulated. So I think a plausible case can be
made that P threatens continued custody under suspicion of crime X in
order to get S to do A, and intending that S realize she's been threatened
by P.
In sum, Miranda's conclusion that custodial interrogation in the
absence of certain information is coercive is fully consistent with
Nozick's account, if one stresses the notion of positive liberty implicit in
the Court's analysis. Even my further suggestion that the Miranda
warnings themselves may be coercive can be explained by (or is at least
consistent with) Nozick's account; here, however, I rely more on an
empirical notion of coercion and less on a positive liberty notion.
C. Post- Miranda
I argued in the last section that the Miranda Court was not sufficiently
92. See Thomas & Bilder, supra note 4, at 277-81 (surveying empirical studies and concluding
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prescient about the dilemma the warnings themselves might create, per-
haps because of their over-reliance on a positive liberty conception. Ore-
gon v. Elstad93 demonstrates that the Court continues to adhere to a
positive liberty view of the power of the warnings. Elstad made an
incriminating admission in response to a question the officer asked before
giving Miranda warnings; the officer later supplied the warnings and
obtained a "waiver" and a full confession. The Court held the full con-
fession admissible, rejecting Elstad's argument that he confessed only
because he had already incriminated himself-that the "cat was out of
the bag"-and that the Miranda warnings actually made his situation
worse.
One way to read what happened in Elstad is that the Miranda warn-
ings themselves created a threat-"what you have already said will be
used against you in court; if you wish any benefit from me, you must try
even harder to explain your actions." 94 Read this way, and without
regard to my earlier argument that the warnings may always create a
threat, the warnings in Elstad are a threat because it is not true that the
earlier statement could be used against him. In this situation, S could
morally expect to make a decision about whether to answer based on an
accurate assessment of whether his earlier statement could be used
against him.
The Court held, however, that when Elstad "waived" his Miranda
rights, he possessed all the information he needed to make an informed
decision about answering future questions." Whether Elstad was
coerced under the Nozick account is debatable. As noted a moment ago,
condition 3 may not be satisfied. And the warnings may not even be a
threat in Elstad. Elstad may have understood P to say, "You are already
as good as convicted; we are not going to release you; you might as well
tell us the rest of it."96 If S believes this, P has devalued S's silence, but it
is difficult to see how devalued silence is a threat. P is not threatening to
do anything if S does NA. It is as if P tells S, "That necklace you think is
worth $10,000 is worth only $5,000." If S believes P, P has devalued the
necklace, but P is not proposing to do anything to take advantage of S's
phenomenologically diminished baseline.
93. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
94. This reading is made more likely by the fact that his initial admission, while incriminating,
was not a full confession. Id. at 301 (noting that he answered "I was there" to P's statement that P
"felt he was involved" in a neighborhood burglary). Thus, he might have still believed that he could
convince the officers to release him if he answered their questions, particularly if he described a small
role in the crime and some excuse for participating. See id at 301 (relating that Elstad said he
"wished to speak with the officers"); id. at 302 (Elstad admitted being paid to assist others with the
crime and added to the written statement, in his own handwriting, that one of the others gave him a
small bag of "grass").
95. Id. at 316-17.
96. Id. at 312 (noting "vast difference" between "coercion of a confession by physical violence or
other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will" and "disclosure of a 'guilty secret'
freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question").
[Vol. 5: 79
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/4
Thomas
My point about Elstad, therefore, is not that the Court necessarily
reached a result inconsistent with the Nozick account but, rather, that
the Court continues to believe the Miranda warnings counteract all inter-
rogation-based coercion. In responding to the argument that the warn-
ings made Elstad's situation worse, the Court noted that administration
of Miranda warnings to an S who has already given a "voluntary but
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions
that precluded admission of the earlier statement.
97
Elstad thus shows that the Court is committed to a positive liberty
view that withholding crucial information can make a proposal coercive
(though one might disagree with the Court about what information
should be crucial). I argued earlier that the Nozick account similarly
contemplates a positive liberty knowledge requirement in defining the
relevant baseline. The Nozick account does not, however, include the
other positive liberty element-ensuring that S has minimum capacity-
and the Supreme Court has also rejected this aspect of positive liberty, in
Colorado v. Connelly.9" Connelly approached a uniformed police officer
on the street and confessed to a murder because the "voice of God" had
given him the choice "either to confess to the killing or to commit sui-
cide." 99 The state courts applied a conception of coercion that entails
positive liberty/minimum capacity to hold Connelly's statement inadmis-
sible: "One's capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be over-
borne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external
pressure."'" The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Constitution
does not require a confessing suspect be "totally rational and properly
motivated."''
Connelly also noted that Fifth Amendment coercion exists only when
the state is the coercer, stating that even the "most outrageous behavior
by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not
make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause."' 2 Con-
nelly's limitation of the clause to government actors is consistent with
Thomas Hobbes's statement of the underlying principle and with the his-
tory of the origin of the clause.' 03 In addition, the state's conduct in
seeking to introduce compelled out-of-court statements is not itself coer-
cive. There is no threat to do something unless S does A. There is no
97. Id. at 314.
98. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
99. Id. at 161.
100. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985).
101. 479 U.S. at 166. For a more detailed discussion of Connelly and its critics, see Thomas &
Bilder, supra note 4, at 259-62.
102. 479 U.S. at 166. The Court's reference to the Due Process Clause as the relevant
constitutional protection is presumably because the case arose in state court, and it is the Due
Process Clause that makes the self-incrimination clause applicable to the states. See Malloy v.
Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964).
103. See THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN, ch. 21; LEVY, supra note 22, at 43-82.
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threat at all. If the state did not coerce the confession, it is difficult to
argue that the state by seeking admission of the confession is thereby
coercing S to testify. Connelly's conclusion that the clause bars only
coercion by Ps who are government actors is thus consistent with the
history of the clause and the Nozick account.
But the baseline issue is more troublesome. In the interrogation con-
text, Miranda resolved the issue by presuming that custodial interroga-
tion is a threat. Outside the interrogation room, however, the Court has
yet to adopt a clear standard. In California v. Byers,"°" the Court seemed
to rely on a phenomenological baseline. At issue was the constitutional-
ity of a state statute that required a driver involved in an accident to
leave her name and address at the accident scene or face a jail term. As
compliance with this statute meets the other relevant conditions, 10 5 self-
identification would be coerced if the statute constitutes a threat under
condition 1. Neither the statistical nor moral baseline appears to define
P's requirement as a threat. The statute would be the best indication of
what society statistically expects drivers to do after an accident, and no
reason exists to assume that the moral baseline would be different. So the
question turns on the phenomenological baseline. Does S experience the
statute's requirement as leaving her worse off if she fails to comply than
she was in the absence of the statute? Clearly she does. If the phenome-
nological baseline is appropriately part of the threat baselines, then the
statute poses a threat. While the Court could not muster a majority
opinion on the question of whether the statute violated the self-incrimi-
nation clause, the Court unanimously agreed that Byers had been
coerced to identify himself. °6
But a later case emphasized the moral baseline. In South Dakota v.
Neville, °7 state law permitted drivers suspected of drunk driving to
choose whether or not to take a blood-alcohol test. If a driver refused
the test, one consequence was that evidence of the refusal could be admit-
ted in a drunk driving prosecution. Neville refused to take the test and
104. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
105. The statutory penalty would make NA substantially less eligible as a course of conduct
under condition 2, and P (the government, in this situation, rather than the police) makes the threat
in order to get S to do A, intending that S recognize she has been threatened by P. Conditions 4 and
5 are not relevant because Byers did not comply; instead, he sought a self-incrimination clause
privilege to ignore the statute. When deciding this kind of question, the Court assumes that the
statute would cause S to do A and asks whether the state should be permitted to coerce A.
106. Id. at 434 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (characterizing what happened as "compelled
disclosure of identity"); id. at 457 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing "California's
decision to compel Byers to stop after his accident and identify himself'); id. at 459 (Black, J.
dissenting) (noting relevant principle "forbids the Federal government to compel a person to supply
information which can be used ... to prosecute him for a crime"); id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing issue as whether government should be able "to use an individual's compelled
statements"). As Byers did not comply with the statute, the issue was not whether P compelled S to
do A, but whether S had a privilege not to comply with the statute, an issue beyond the scope of this
paper.
107. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
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later objected to the admission of his refusal on the ground that he was
coerced to refuse by the threat of the blood test.
P's proposal is probably a threat under the phenomenological baseline
approach. In effect, P says to S, "I will use the blood test results against
you if you do NA" (where NA means not refuse, or take the test).10
While we do not know S's expectations precisely, he must have hoped
that his future baseline included not taking a test that would provide
accurate evidence against him. Indeed, his gratuitous explanation to P
for why he refused the test ("I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test") sug-
gests as much.109
The Court adopted something like a moral baseline to conclude that
what P did was not a threat. Under the Court's previous case law, com-
pelling a blood test is permissible under the self-incrimination clause. 110
Thus, S's moral baseline, measured by what the Constitution permits,
could not include freedom from taking the blood test. This explains the
key part of the Court's opinion: Since "the offer of taking a blood-alcohol
test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the
State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penal-
ties for making that choice."1 ' Although the Court's analysis is con-
fined to the moral baseline, a statistical baseline probably reaches the
same result. If state law permits police to force the choice that Neville
faced, that is likely to be the socially expected outcome.
Neville is not, however, a rejection of the phenomenological baseline
for two reasons. First, the statute in Neville requested evidence that is
not protected by the self-incrimination clause, thus permitting the Court
to use the clause itself to define a moral baseline against which to mea-
sure the consequences of S doing NA. In the category of statutes that
punish nonproduction of evidence protected by the clause (Byers), a phe-
nomenological baseline seems most true to the Nozick account and the
history of that clause. 112
108. P did not actually say the results would be used in evidence, but he strongly implied it. Id.
at 555 n.2 (P said to S that "I have arrested you" for drunk driving and that "I request that you
submit to a chemical test of your blood to determine your blood alcohol concentration").
109. Id. at 555. Admittedly, Neville presents an odd kind of threat, one that may fail to satisfy
condition 2 (NA with the threatened consequence is rendered substantially less eligible as a course of
conduct than NA without the threatened consequence). We can assume that S would not want to
take a blood test whether or not P threatened him with a penalty if he took it.
110. The Court had held that disclosing properties of one's blood is not "being a witness
against" oneself. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Neville, on the other hand,
assumed that a refusal is evidence protected by the clause. 459 U.S. at 560-61.
111. Id. at 563 (emphasis in original). The Court's analysis can also be explained as the classic
doctrine of "the greater and the lesser." Under this doctrine, which Justice Holmes often espoused,
if the government can prohibit some act entirely, it may place conditions on doing the act. For a
critical analysis of the "greater-lesser" doctrine, see Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1304-14.
112. The clause was intended to limit the power of government to compel disclosure. See
generally LEVY, supra note 22. Thus, saying that the existence of a legislative act establishes the
statistical and moral baseline ignores the reason to have a prohibition of compelled disclosure in the
first place. And, on Nozick's account, the proposal to punish theft is a threat even though it is the
legislatively-established, hence expected, course of events.
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The second reason that Neville does not reject the phenomenological
baseline is that the outcome can be justified under condition 3-P threat-
ens S in order to get S to do A-a requirement that, I argued earlier, was
consistent with self-incrimination clause concerns. Notice that P is actu-
ally seeking alternative items of evidence and will obtain one or the other
item in every case-that is, S will either take a blood test or S will refuse.
The alternative nature of P's threat means, I think, that condition 3 is
not satisfied. In Neville, P is not threatening the blood test in order to get
S to refuse it so the refusal can be used against S; quite the contrary, P
tells S that he wants him to take the blood test," 3 and there is no reason
to doubt P's sincerity since a test will provide more damning evidence (if
P is right that S is drunk). Even if P is indifferent as to whether S takes
the test or refuses, condition 3 would not be satisfied.
While Neville does not speak to a condition 3 requirement, the Court
has in other cases held that there is no coercion when the police, without
intent to cause a confession, engage in conduct that causes S to con-
fess.1 4 One other thing can be said in favor of making condition 3 part
of judicial self-incrimination doctrine-it is consistent with Miranda.
The Miranda rule applies only to custodial interrogation, an inherently
purposive police activity that would always meet condition 3.
Cases like Neville, Connelly, and Elstad show that real-life questions
before the Supreme Court bear a strong resemblance to the "bizarre"
counterexamples invented by philosophers. The Court's analysis of these
questions, consistent with Nozick's account, endorses Nozick's condition
3 and thus limits coercion to threats by P, where P is a government actor,
which are intended to get S to do A. When considering what proposals
count as threats, the Court has alternated between a moral baseline (Nev-
ille) and a phenomenological baseline (Byers), without articulating a rea-
son for preferring one over the other. The most likely reason for the
distinction is that the moral baseline was easily determined in Neville
since the form of evidence sought was not protected by the self-incrimi-
nation clause. In the Byers category of statutes that require disclosure of
protected evidence, both the moral and statistical baselines seem beside
the point.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nozick account provides a good description of the Supreme
Court's approach to coerced self-incrimination. It explains the pre-
Miranda cases reviewing state court convictions and also suggests that
the pre-Miranda approach was not significantly different from Miranda's
113. 459 U.S. at 555 n.2 (printed card stated in part, "I request that you submit to a chemical
test of your blood to determine your blood alcohol concentration.").
114. See Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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approach. This link between what may appear to be two very different
theories of coercion is a plausible explanation for Miranda's continued
vitality in the face of the Supreme Court's growing conservatism over the
last two decades. Nozick's account also explains the post-Miranda
developments. It explains why mental illness cannot be a basis for find-
ing coercion; it explains why P cannot inadvertently coerce S; and it
offers an alternative explanation for why a refusal to take a blood test is
not coerced by the threat of the test itself.
With a simple amplification I offered, Nozick's account also explains
the Miranda remedy of requiring warnings. While Nozick's account
clearly explains why Miranda found custodial interrogations coercive, it
is not apparent from Nozick's account why the Miranda warnings are
adequate to dispel the threats pervading the interrogation room.115 I
argued that Nozick's account must be enlarged somewhat to accommo-
date a positive liberty conception of coercion, at least with respect to S's
knowledge of crucial information. Once this dimension is highlighted,
the Miranda warnings can easily be seen as effective remedies to the
problem.
If the positive liberty gloss on Nozick's account explains the Court's
reliance on Miranda warnings, it does not explain their surprising inef-
fectiveness in actually resisting the coercive power of custodial interroga-
tion. I argued that we can only understand the ineffectiveness of the
warnings if we use a phenomenological baseline. This baseline reveals
what may be a defect of the positive liberty conception: information
alone may not be sufficient to counteract the threats perceived by S when
she is in such a vulnerable position. Indeed, certain information-for
example, that P is certain S knows something about the crime-may
actually be coercive in itself.
As with any analytical tool, my adaptation of Nozick's account does
not provide easy answers to difficult cases. It does, however, direct atten-
tion to the particular aspect of the coercion inquiry that makes the ques-
tion difficult. By narrowing the focus, the coercion account should
promote more clarity in analysis. It also offers an explanation of why
particular judicial doctrines have arisen, and it provides a plausible
explanation of why Miranda has not had the effect the Court anticipated.
My paper is a partial, experimental verification of the Nozick account.
The verification does not mean that the account is "right" in any ulti-
mate sense-that it holds the key to understanding freedom and
unfreedom. But the verification does mean the Nozick account is "right"
in that it explains the cases and thus offers insight into how our culture
views coercion. We intuitively use moral and statistical baselines to eval-
uate "threat" (and perhaps phenomenological baselines as well); we draw
115. Nozick's goal, of course, was not showing how to prevent occurrences of coercion.
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a distinction between intentional and inadvertent coercion; and we
believe that someone has been coerced when she does something partly
because she has been threatened. These conclusions may not be the
metaphysically "right" way to view coercion, but they are (it appears to
me) the way our culture views coercion.
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